We develop a general stochastic model of directed search on the job. Directed search allows us to focus on a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) where agents' value functions, policy functions and market tightness do not depend on the distribution of workers over wages and unemployment. We formally prove existence of a BRE under various specifications of workers' preferences and contractual environments, including dynamic contracts and fixedwage contracts. Solving a BRE is as easy as solving a representative agent model, in contrast to the analytical and computational difficulties in models of random search on the job. JEL classifications: E24, E32, J64.
Introduction
This paper studies a general model of search on the job that allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks, and different specifications of the contractual environment. We formally establish existence of a type of equilibria, called block recursive equilibria, which are tractable for studying equilibrium dynamics. To attain this main result, we depart from the bulk of the literature on search on the job, which assumes that search is random or undirected in the sense that a worker does not have any information about the terms of trade offered by different firms before applying for jobs. Instead, we assume that search is directed in the sense that a worker knows the terms of trade offered by different firms before choosing where to apply for a job. 1 The models of random search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen [5] , Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] , and Burdett and Coles [4] are a useful tool for studying labor markets because they can simultaneously and parsimoniously explain a number of qualitative features of the data.
For example, they can explain the empirical regularities in the transition of workers between employment and unemployment and across jobs that pay different wages (e.g. the negative relationship between job hazard and tenure). They can explain why similar workers employed at similar firms are paid different wages and why wages tend to increase with tenure and experience. 2 However, these models are difficult to solve outside the steady state because the distribution of workers across different wages and unemployment is an infinite-dimensional state variable which non-trivially affects agents' value and policy functions. 3 This technical feature limits the use of these models. For example, a macroeconomist cannot measure the effect of aggregate productivity shocks on the flows of workers across different employment states and on the wage distribution by simply comparing steady states, unless he has reason to believe that these shocks are very persistent and that the transition phases have negligible length. A public economist cannot measure the welfare effect of a change in the unemployment benefit legislation by comparing two steady states, unless he has reason to believe that agents' discount factor is approximately zero and, hence, the transition phases are unimportant. And if an econometrician estimates the steady state of a model, he has to be careful in using data from a period of time when the fundamentals of the economy have remained approximately unchanged. 4 Moreover, the hypothesis that the search process is random appears at odds with the empirical evidence. For example, in a recent survey of the US labor market, Hall and Krueger ( [9] , Table   1 ) find that 84 percent of white, male, non-college workers either "knew exactly" or "had a pretty good idea" about how much their current job would pay from the very beginning of the application process (at the time of the first interview). Another piece of evidence against the random search hypothesis and in favor of directed search comes from [11] . Using data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project Survey, this study finds that firms in high-wage industries tend to attract more applicants per vacancy than firms in low-wage industries. These findings should not be surprising, as directed search reflects the fundamental idea in economics that prices help a market allocating resources.
In this paper, we consider a stochastic model of directed search on the job. This model is rather general in that it allows for aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and for different specifications of the contractual environment (fixed-wage contracts and dynamic contracts). For this model, we prove existence of an equilibrium in which agents' value and policy functions do not depend on the infinite-dimensional distribution of workers across different employment states. We refer to this equilibrium as a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE henceforth). As is accomplished by undirected search models of [5] , [23] , and [4] , the BRE of our model generates: (i) worker flows between employment, unemployment, and across employers; (ii) a negative relationship between job hazard and tenure; (iii) residual wage inequality; and (iv) a positive return to tenure and experience. In contrast to these other models, the BRE of our model can be easily computed in and out of the steady state. Therefore, our model can be used, without qualifications, to carry out the labor market measurements that we have described above.
It is precisely the difference in the nature of the search process that explains why our model admits a BRE and the models by Burdett and Mortensen [5] , Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] , and Burdett and Coles [4] do not. If the search process is directed, workers only apply for jobs that they intend to accept. This self-selection mechanism implies that a firm meets exclusively applicants who are willing to fill its job opening and, hence, its value from a meeting an applicant is independent of the distribution of workers across employment states. This property, together 4 Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] explicitly acknowledge that estimating the steady state of an OJS model restricts their choice of data: "We have deliberately selected a much shorter period than is available because we want to find out whether it is possible to estimate our model over a homogeneous period of the business cycle. It would have been very hard to defend the assumption of time-invariant parameters (the job offer arrival rate parameters in particular) had we been using a longer panel." Similarly, Jolivet et al. [12] state that they "choose to restrict our analysis to a 3-year sample for three reasons. [...] Third, the model assumes that the labor market is in a steady-state, an assumption that would be harder to defend over a longer period of time."
with free entry of firms in the labor market, implies that the probability that a firm meets an applicant and, similarly, the probability that an applicant finds a job are also independent of the distribution of workers across employment states. In turn, the independence of these meeting probabilities implies that the value and policy functions of workers and firms are independent of the distribution of workers across employment states. In contrast, if the search process is random, workers sometimes apply for jobs that they are not willing to accept. Therefore, if the search process is random, the distribution of workers across employment states does affect the probability that the firm meets an applicant that is willing to fill its job opening, the expected value to the firm from meeting an applicant, the equilibrium probability that a firm meets an applicant and, ultimately, the agents' value and policy functions. At the end of section 5, we will provide a more detailed explanation for why directed search is important for existence of a BRE.
The main contribution of this paper is to prove existence of a BRE for a relatively general model of directed search on the job which allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks, workers' risk aversion, and for different specifications of the contractual environment. By accomplishing this task we intend to provide a solid foundation for future applications of models of directed search on the job. Delacroix and Shi [7] examine a model of directed search on the job with fixed-wage contracts. However, their analysis only focuses on the steady-state equilibrium.
Shi [27] was the first to formalize the notion of a BRE and to prove existence of a BRE for a model of directed search on the job. However, his model restricts attention to wage-tenure contracts in a steady state. Menzio and Shi [14] prove existence of a BRE for a stochastic model of directed search on the job and calibrate the model to measure the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of unemployment, vacancies, and other labor market variables. However, they restrict attention to the case of complete labor contracts. In order to generalize the results from Shi [27] and Menzio and Shi [14] , the current paper has to develop a different existence proof. For example, the existence proof in Menzio and Shi [14] is based on the equivalence between the solution to the social planner's problem and the equilibrium allocation, which does not hold when employment contracts are incomplete.
The Model

Agents and Markets
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers with measure one and a continuum of firms with positive measure. Each worker has a periodical utility function υ(.) defined over consumption, where υ : R → R is a twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, weakly concave function such that υ 0 (.) ∈ [υ 0 ,ῡ 0 ], 0 < υ 0 ≤ῡ 0 . Each worker maximizes the expected sum of periodical utilities discounted at the factor β ∈ (0, 1). The unemployment benefit is b.
Each firm operates a technology with constant returns to scale which turns one unit of labor into y + z units of consumption. The first component of productivity, y, is common to all firms, and its value lies in the set Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ...y N(y) }, where y ≡ y 1 < ... < y N(y) ≡ȳ and N (y) ≥ 2 is an integer. The second component of productivity, z, is specific to each firm-worker pair, and its value lies in the set Z = {z 1 , z 2 , ...z N (z) }, where z ≡ z 1 < ... < z N(z) ≡z and N (z) ≥ 1 is an integer. Each firm maximizes the expected sum of periodical profits discounted at the factor β.
The labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the expected lifetime utility x that the firms offer to the workers, x ∈ X = [x,x], with x < υ(b)/ (1 − β) andx > υ(ȳ +z)/ (1 − β). Specifically, whenever a firm meets a worker in submarket x, the firm offers the worker an employment contract that gives him the expected lifetime utility x. In submarket x, the ratio of the number of vacancies created by firms to the number of workers looking for jobs is given by the tightness θ(x, ψ) ≥ 0 and is determined in the equilibrium, where ψ is the aggregate state of the economy described below. 5 Time is discrete and continues forever. At the beginning of each period, the state of the Each period is divided into four stages: separation, search, matching and production. During the separation stage, an employed worker is forced to move into unemployment with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). Also, during the separation stage, an employed worker has the option to voluntarily move into unemployment.
During the second stage, a worker gets the opportunity to search for a job with a probability that depends on his recent employment history. In particular, if the worker was unemployed at the beginning of the period, he can send an application with probability λ u ∈ (0, 1]. If the worker was employed at the beginning of the period and did not lose his job during the separation stage, he can search with probability λ e ∈ (0, 1]. If the worker lost his job during the separation stage, he cannot search immediately. Conditional on being able to search, the worker chooses which submarket to visit. In this sense, search is directed. Also, during the search stage, a firm chooses how many vacancies to create and where to locate them. The cost of maintaining a vacancy for one period is k > 0. Both workers and firms take the tightness θ(x, ψ) parametrically. 6 During the matching stage, the workers and the vacancies in submarket x come together through a frictional meeting process. In particular, a worker meets a vacant job with probability p(θ(x, ψ)), where p : R + → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave function such that p(0) = 0 and p 0 (0) < ∞. Similarly, a vacancy meets a worker with probability q(θ(x, ψ)), where q : R + → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, convex function such that q(θ) = p(θ)/θ, q(0) = 1, q 0 (0) < 0, and p(q −1 (.)) concave. 7 When a vacancy and a worker meet, the firm that owns the vacancy offers to the worker an employment contract that gives him the lifetime utility x. If the worker rejects the offer, he returns to his previous employment position. If the worker accepts the offer, the two parties form a new match. To simplify the exposition, we assume that all new matches have the idiosyncratic component of productivity z 0 ∈ Z.
During the last stage, an unemployed worker produces and consumes b ∈ (0,ȳ +z) units of output. A worker employed at a job z produces y + z units of output and consumes w of them, where w is specified by the worker's labor contract. 8 At the end of the production stage, Nature draws next period's aggregate component of productivity,ŷ, from the probability distribution Φŷ(ŷ|y), and next period's idiosyncratic component of productivity,ẑ, from the probability distribution Φẑ(ẑ|z). 9 The draws of the idiosyncratic component of productivity are independent across matches. 10 6 In this paper, workers choose which submarket to visit and that firms choose where to locate their vacancies, given that the tightness in each submarket x is described by θ(x, ψ). This search-and-matching process generates the same equilibrium conditions as the more naturalistic model in which firms post employment contracts for their vacancies and workers choose where to apply for a job (e.g. [1] ). 7 The assumption on p(q −1 (.)) is needed to guarantee that the worker's search problem is strictly concave and, hence, has a unique solution. This assumption is satisfied by some common specifications such as the urnball matching function, q 0 (θ) = 1 − e −1/θ , and the generalized form of the telephone-line matching function, q0(θ) = (
1/γ , where γ ≥ 1 and α ∈ (0, 1]. Modify these functions as q(θ) = (1 − ε)q0(θ) + ε/(1 + θ), where ε ∈ (0, 1) can be an arbitrarily small number. Then, the modified functions satisfy all of the assumptions that we have imposed and, especially, the assumption that q 0 (θ) < 0 for all θ ≥ 0. Note that these assumptions are sufficient, but not necessary, for a BRE to exist. 8 Part of the assumption of timing is that employed workers can voluntarily move into unemployment only at the beginning of the period. This assumption is made entirely for easing exposition and it is not important for the analysis, since our proof of existence can be easily modified to allow employed workers to move into unemployment at the beginning of the production stage. Although the assumption allows for the possibility that some workers at the production stage might be employed at jobs that give them a lifetime utility of V < U, the possibility does not arise when the model is calibrated to the US economy (see section 7).
9 Throughout this paper, the caret on a variable indicates the variable in the next period. 10 To ease exposition, we restrict attention to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks that affect only labor productivity. However, the proof of the existence of a BRE does not depend on this choice, and can be easily generalized to the case in which aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks affect the search process, the value of unemployment, labor income taxes, etc.
Contractual Environment
We consider two alternative contractual environments. In the first environment, the firm commits to an employment contract that specifies the worker's wage as a function of the history of realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, z, the history of realizations of the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, and the history of realizations of a two-point lottery that is drawn at the beginning of every production stage. 11 In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to this environment as the one with "dynamic contracts", since we will formulate the contracts recursively as in the literature on dynamic contracts (e.g., [2] ). 12 In the second environment, the firm commits to a wage that remains constant throughout the entire duration of the employment relationship. This constant wage is allowed to depend only on the outcome of a two-point lottery that is drawn at the beginning of the employment relationship. In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to this environment as the one with "fixed-wage contracts".
We are interested in these two contractual environments because they have been the focus of the literature on random search on the job. The "dynamic contract" environment generalizes the environment considered by Burdett and Coles [4] and Shi [27] to an economy with stochastic productivity. 13 The "fixed-wage contract" environment has been considered by Burdett and Mortensen [5] and [12] . Notice that, in both environments, contracts are incomplete because wages cannot be made contingent upon the outside offers received by the worker.
Worker's Problem
Consider a worker whose current job gives him a lifetime utility V and who has the opportunity to look for a job at the beginning of the search stage. His search decision is to choose which submarket x to visit. If the worker visits submarket x, he succeeds in finding a job with probability p(θ(x, ψ)), and fails with probability 1−p (θ (x, ψ)). If he succeeds, he enters the production stage in a new employment relationship which gives him the lifetime utility x. If he fails to find a new match (or if he does not apply for a job), he enters the production stage by retaining his current employment position, which gives him a lifetime utility V . Therefore, the worker's lifetime utility 11 We allow for the lottery in order to guarantee that the profit of the firm is a concave function of the value of the employment contract to the worker. In this sense, lotteries play a similar role in our model as in [24] . In turn, concavity of the profit of the firm (together with concavity of the composite function p(q −1 (.))) guarantees that the search problem of the worker is strictly concave and its solution unique (see the proof of Lemma 4.1). Finally, the uniqueness of the search strategy of the worker is needed to establish the continuity of the equilibrium mapping T (see the proof of Lemma 5.2).
12 In contrast to most models in the literature on dynamic contracts, however, there is no private information in our model, and a worker can quit for another contract or into unemployment in any period during the contract. 13 In the special case where workers are risk neutral, the dynamic contracts considered in this paper attain the same allocation as the complete contracts considered in Menzio and Shi [14] do. Therefore, the proof of existence of a BRE in this paper generalizes the existence proof in Menzio and Shi [14] .
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at the beginning of the search stage is V + max{0, R(V, ψ)}, where R is the search value function (i.e., the return to search) defined as
Denote m(V, ψ) as the solution to the maximization problem in (2.1), andp(V, ψ) as the composite function p(θ(m(V, ψ), ψ)).
Next, consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage, and denote as U(ψ) his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker produces and consumes b units of output. During the next search stage period, the worker is unemployed and has the opportunity to look for a job with probability λ u . Therefore, the worker's lifetime utility U (ψ) is equal to
Dynamic Contracts
Consider a firm that has just met a worker in submarket x. The firm offers to the worker an employment contract that specifies his wage at every future date as a function of the realized history of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, the realized history of the aggregate state of the economy, and the history of realizations of a two-point lottery that is drawn at the beginning of every production stage. The firm chooses the contract to maximize its profits while delivering the promised lifetime utility x to the worker. Characterizing the solution to this problem is difficult because the dimension of the history upon which wages are contingent grows to infinity with time. However, following the literature on dynamic contracts (e.g. [2] ), we can rewrite this problem recursively by using the worker's lifetime utility as an auxiliary state variable. 14 In the recursive formulation of the problem, the state of the contract at the beginning of the production stage in an arbitrary period is described by the worker's lifetime utility, V , the state of the aggregate economy, ψ, and the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, z. (If the period is the first period of the contract, then V = x.) Let s denote (ψ, z). Given V and s, the firm chooses a two-point lottery over the worker's wage w in the current period, the worker's probability d of becoming unemployed in the next separation stage, and the worker's lifetime utilityV at the beginning of the next production stage. That is, the firm chooses a two-point
, where π i is the probability that the realization of the lottery is 14 More precisely, we can prove that the value function of the firm's contracting problem is the unique solution to the recursive problem (2.3). Also, we can prove that the firm's contracting problem yields the same solutions as the recursive problem (2.3). The proofs of these equivalence results are standard and available upon request.
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(w i , d i ,V i ). Note that d i andV i are plans contingent onŝ because they will be realized in the next period. The firm chooses c to maximize the sum of its profits from the current period onward. Therefore, the firm's maximized value J(V, s) is equal to
The last constraint is the promise-keeping constraint, which requires c to provide the worker with the lifetime utility V . The second last constraint is the individual rationality constraint on separation, which requires the separation probability d to be consistent with the worker's incentives to quit into unemployment. We denote the optimal policy function associated with
, where
Fixed-Wage Contracts
With fixed-wage contracts, we assume that workers are risk neutral; i.e., υ(w) = w for all w.
Consider a worker who is employed for a wage of w at the beginning of the production stage, and denote as H(w, ψ) his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker consumes w units of output. During the next separation stage, the worker is forced by Nature to become unemployed with probability δ, and has the option of keeping his job with probability 1 − δ. If the worker becomes unemployed, he does not have the opportunity to look for a new job during the next search stage. If the workers keeps his job, he has the opportunity to look for a better job with probability λ e . Therefore, the worker's lifetime utility H(w, ψ) is equal to
We denote as h(V, ψ) the wage that provides an employed worker with the lifetime utility V .
That is, h(V, ψ) is the solution for w to the equation H(w, ψ) = V .
Next, consider a firm that employs a worker for a wage of w at the beginning of the production stage, and denote as K(w, s) its lifetime profit. In the current period, the firm's profit is given by y + z − w. The discounted sum of profits from the next period onward is
Finally, consider a firm that has just met a worker in submarket x = V , and denote as J(V, ψ, z 0 ) its lifetime profit. The firm offers to the worker a two-point lottery over the constant wage w. The firm's offer is required to provide the worker with the lifetime utility V (if accepted).
Therefore, the firm's lifetime profit J(V, ψ, z 0 ) is equal to
We denote the optimal policy function associated with (2.6) as c = (
Market Tightness
During the search stage, a firm chooses how many vacancies to create and where to locate them.
The firm's benefit of creating a vacancy in submarket x is the product between the matching probability, q(θ(x, ψ)), and the value of meeting a worker, J(x, ψ, z 0 ). The firm's cost of creating a vacancy is k. When the benefit is strictly smaller than the cost, the firm's optimal policy is to create no vacancies in x. When the benefit is strictly greater than the cost, the firm's optimal policy is to create infinitely many vacancies in x. And when the benefit and the cost are equal, the firm's profit is independent of the number of vacancies it creates in submarket x.
In any submarket that is visited by a positive number of workers, the tightness θ(x; y) is consistent with the firm's optimal creation strategy if and only if
and θ(x, ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. In any submarket that workers do not visit, the tightness θ(x, ψ) is consistent with the firm's optimal creation strategy if and only if q(θ(x, ψ))J(x, ψ, z 0 )
is smaller or equal than k. However, following the rest of the literature on directed search on the job (i.e. Shi [27] and Menzio and Shi [14] ), we restrict attention to equilibria in which the tightness θ(x, ψ) satisfies the above complementary slackness condition in every submarket. 15 
BRE: Definition and Procedure
The previous section motivates the following definition of a recursive equilibrium:
A Recursive Equilibrium consists of a market tightness function θ : X×Ψ → R + , a search value function R : X×Ψ → R, a search policy function m : X×Ψ → X, an unemployment value function U : Ψ → R, a firm's value function J : X × Ψ × Z → R, a contract policy function c : X × Ψ × Z → C, and a transition probability function for the aggregate state of the economy
. These functions satisfy the following requirements:
(ii) R satisfies (2.1) for all (V, ψ) ∈ X × Ψ, and m is the associated policy function;
(iv) J satisfies (2.3) or (2.6) for all (V, ψ, z) ∈ X ×Ψ×Z, and c is the associated policy function;
(v) Φψ is derived from the policy functions, (m, c), and the probability distributions for (ŷ,ẑ).
Solving a recursive equilibrium outside the steady state requires solving a system of functional equations in which the unknown functions depend on the entire distribution of workers across employment states, (u, g). Since the dimension of this distribution is large (and infinite in the version of the model with dynamic contracts), solving a recursive equilibrium outside the steady state is a difficult task both analytically and computationally. In contrast, solving the following class of equilibria is much easier because it involves solving a system of functional equations in which the unknown functions have at most three dimensions. In this paper, we establish existence of a BRE. To this aim, we define
In words, a function J in the set J depends on ψ only through y; it is bounded, and strictly decreasing and weakly concave in V ; and its "derivative" with respect to V is bounded above and below, i.e. J is bi-Lipschitz continuous in V . 17 In Appendix A, we prove that J is a non-empty, bounded, closed and convex subset of the space of bounded, continuous functions on X × Y × Z, with the sup norm. 18 In section 4, we take an arbitrary firm's value function J from the set J . Given J, we prove that the market tightness function, θ, that solves the equilibrium condition (2.7) depends on the state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across employment states, (u, g). Intuitively, since the value of filling a vacancy in submarket x does not depend on the distribution of workers and the cost of creating a vacancy is constant, the equilibrium probability of filling a vacancy in submarket x, and hence the tightness of submarket x, must be independent of the distribution of workers.
Given θ, we prove that the search value function, R, that solves the equilibrium condition (2.1) depends on ψ only through y. Intuitively, R does not depend on (u, g), because neither the probability that a worker finds a job in submarket x nor the benefit to a worker from finding a job in submarket x depends on the employment status of other workers in the economy. Given R, we prove that the unemployment value function, U, that solves the equilibrium condition (2.2) depends on ψ only through y. Intuitively, U does not depend on (u, g), because neither the output of an unemployed worker nor his return to search depends on the distribution of workers across different employment states.
In section 5, we insert J, θ, R, and U in the RHS of the equilibrium condition (2.3) to construct an update of the firm's value function, where T maps the function J with which the above procedure starts into a new function. First, we prove that T J depends on ψ only through y. Intuitively, T J does not depend on (u, g) because the output of a match in the current period, the probability that a match survives until the next production stage, and the value to the firm of a match at the next production stage are all independent of the distribution of workers across employment states. Second, we prove that T J is bounded between J andJ; it is strictly decreasing and weakly concave in V ; and its "derivative" with respect to V is bounded between −B J and −B J . Intuitively, the firm's updated value function, T J, is bounded because the output of the match is bounded and there is time discounting; T J is decreasing because a firm finds it costly to provide a worker with higher lifetime utility; T J is concave because the contract between a firm and a worker includes a lottery; and the "derivative" of T J is bounded because the derivative of
where B2 is a strictly positive constant. We need the firm's value function J to be bi-Lipschitz in order to ensure the set J to be closed and convex. In addition, bi-Lipschitz continuity implies that J is strictly decreasing, a property that will be used to establish important properties such as those of the market tightness.
18 Throughout this paper, the norm is the sup norm unless it is specified otherwise. the worker's utility function is bounded. Third, we prove that T J is continuous in J.
From the first two properties of T J above, it follows that the equilibrium operator T maps the set of firm's value functions J into itself. From the third property of T J, it follows that the equilibrium operator T is continuous in J. From bi-Lipschitz continuity of T J, it follows that the family of functions T (J ) is equicontinuous. Overall, the equilibrium operator T satisfies the assumptions of Schauder's fixed point theorem (see [29] , Theorem 17.4), and, hence, there exists a J * ∈ J such that J * = T J * . Applying one more time the above procedure that leads to the mapping T , but with the firm's value function J * , we can construct equilibrium policy functions θ * , R * , m * , U * , and c * . These functions and J * constitute a BRE for the version of the model with dynamic contracts. In section 6, we use a similar argument to prove existence of a BRE for the version of the model with fixed-wage contracts.
General Properties of an Equilibrium
In this section we take an arbitrary J ∈ J as a firm's value function. Given J, we compute the market tightness function, θ, the search value and policy functions, R and m, and the value function of unemployment, U , that solve the equilibrium conditions (2.7), (2.1) and (2.2). Then, we prove that these functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across employment states, (u, g). Clearly, this property is necessary to establish existence of a BRE.
Next, we characterize the functions θ, R and m. In particular, we prove that the market tightness function, θ, is Lipschitz continuous and decreasing in x, that the search value function, R, is Lipschitz continuous and decreasing in V , and that the search policy function, m, is Lipschitz continuous and increasing in V . Finally, we prove that the functions θ, R, m and U are continuous in the firm's value function J with which they are computed. These properties will be used in section 5 to establish that the equilibrium operator T is a continuous mapping on J.
Market Tightness
Starting with an arbitrary value function of the firm, J ∈ J , we construct the market tightness function and analyze its properties. For all (x, ψ) ∈ X × Ψ such that J(x, y, z 0 ) ≥ k, the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is given by a market tightness q −1 (k/J(x, y, z 0 )),
that J(x, y, z 0 ) < k, the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is given by a market tightness 0. The condition J(x, y, z 0 ) ≥ k is satisfied if and only if x ≤x(y), wherex(y) is the solution to the equation J(x, y, z 0 ) = k with respect to x. From these observations, it follows that the
is the unique solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) for all (x, ψ) ∈ X × Ψ.
The market tightness function, θ, has several properties. First, θ depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across different employment states, (u, g). Second, the market tightness function, θ, is strictly decreasing with respect to x. Intuitively, since the firm's value from filling a vacancy is lower in a submarket with a higher x, the firm's probability of filling a vacancy must be higher. Third, the market tightness function, θ, is Lipschitz continuous in
x for all x, and bi-Lipschitz in x for x <x(y). Intuitively, since the firm's value function, J, is bi-Lipschitz continuous in x and the derivative of the function q −1 (.) is bounded, the market tightness function defined in (4.1) is also bi-Lipschitz continuous for all such x that θ (x, y) > 0.
Finally, the probability that a worker meets a vacancy in submarket x, p(θ(x, y)), decreases at an increasing rate as x increases. This property follows from the concavity of the firm's value function J and of the composite function p(q −1 (.)). These properties of θ are summarized in the following lemma and proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.1. (i) For all y ∈ Y , the market tightness function, θ, is such that
where B J andB J are the bi-Lipschitz bounds on all functions in J .
(ii) For all y ∈ Y and all x ∈ [x,x (y)], the composite function p(θ(x, y)) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in x.
The function θ (x, y) constructed above depends on the arbitrary function J. Consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let θ n denote the market tightness function computed with J n , and θ r with J r . In the following lemma, we prove that, if the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, so does the distance between θ n and θ r . That is, the market tightness function, θ, is continuous in the firm's value function J with which it is computed.
Lemma 4.2. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
Search Problem
Given the firm's value function J ∈ J , the market tightness function θ defined in (4.1) satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.7). Given θ, the search value function, R, that satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.1) is equal to max x∈X f (x, V, y) for all (x, ψ) ∈ X × Ψ, where
Note that, for all (V, ψ) ∈ X × Ψ, the objective function, f , depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across different employment states, (u, g).
Also, note that the choice set, X, is independent of the aggregate state of the economy, ψ. From these observations, it follows that the optimal search decision and the search value function, R, depend on ψ only through y and not through (u, g).
Given θ, a search policy function satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.1) if its value belongs
f , is negative for all x in the interval [x, V ], strictly positive for all x in the interval (V,x(y)), and equal to zero for all x in the interval [x(y),x]. Moreover, the objective function is strictly concave in x for all x in the interval (V,x(y)) (see the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Shi [27] ). Therefore, if V <x(y), the argmax is unique and belongs to the interval (V,x(y)). If V ≥x(y), the argmax includes any point between V andx. From these observations, it follows that the unique solution
In Lemma 4.3, we prove that the return to search, R, is decreasing in V . Intuitively, since the value to a worker from finding a job in submarket x is decreasing in the value of his current employment position, V , and the probability that a worker finds a job in submarket x is independent of V , the return to search is decreasing in V . Also, in Lemma 4.3, we prove that the search policy function, m, is increasing in V . Intuitively, since the marginal rate of substitution between the value offered by a new job and the probability of finding a new job is decreasing in V , the optimal search strategy is increasing in V .
Lemma 4.3. For all y ∈ Y and all V 1 ,V 2 ∈ X, V 1 ≤ V 2 , the search value function, R, satisfies: 6) and the search policy function, m, is such that
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of the functions θ,x, m and p on y. Let V 1 and V 2 be two arbitrary points in X, with V 1 ≤ V 2 . We have:
where the first inequality in both lines uses the fact that R(V i ) is equal to f (m(V i ), V i ) and greater than f (m(V −i ), V i ) where −i 6 = i and i, −i = 1, 2. Thus, (4.6) holds.
Turn to (4.7). If V 1 ≥x, then m(V 2 ) = V 2 and m(V 1 ) = V 1 . In this case, (4.7) clearly holds.
. Also in this case, (4.7) holds. Now, consider the remaining case where
Since p(θ(x)) is decreasing in x, the previous inequality implies that m( 
.
Recall that the function p (θ (x)) is decreasing and concave in x for all x ≤x (y). Since
. From these observations and the inequalities above, it follows that m(
Now we turn to the composite functionp(V, y) = p(θ(m(V, y), y)). The functionp(V, y) is the probability that an employed worker finds a new job during the matching stage, given that his current job gives him the lifetime utility V and the aggregate productivity is y. The following corollary states that the functionp (V, y) is decreasing and Lipschitz continuous in V :
Corollary 4.4. For all y ∈ Y and all V 1 , V 2 ∈ X, V 1 ≤ V 2 , the quitting probabilityp is such that
8)
Proof: Let y be an arbitrary point in Y , and let V 1 , V 2 be two points in X with V 1 ≤ V 2 . From Lemma 4.3, it follows that the difference m(V 2 , y) − m(V 1 , y) is greater than 0 and smaller than
These are the bounds in (4.8). ¥ Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let θ n denote the market tightness function computed with J n , R n and m n the search value and policy functions computed with θ n , andp n (V, y) the composite function p(θ n (m n (V, y), y)). Similarly, let θ r , R r , m r andp r (V, y)
be the functions computed with J r . In the following lemma, we first prove that, if the distancebetween J n and J r converges to zero, so do the distances between R n and R r and betweenp n and p r . While it is intuitive that R is continuous in J, proving continuity ofp in J is more involved, becausep depends on the policy function m. In principle, it may be possible that the policy functions m n and m r are far apart even when the value functions R n and R r are close to each other. To prove continuity ofp in J, we explore concavity of the composite function p(θ(x)).
Lemma 4.5. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions on V and y. Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number. Let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ. Let (V, y) be an arbitrary point in X × Y . We have:
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (4.3). Since this result holds for all (V, y) ∈ X × Y , we conclude that kR n − R r k < α R ρ. the case where p(θ r (m r )) ≤ p(θ n (m n )). In this case, we have:
where the first inequality uses the fact that p(θ n (x)) is decreasing in x and m n ≥ m r , and the second inequality uses the bounds in (4.3).
Second, consider the case where p(θ r (m r )) > p(θ n (m n )) and m n − 2ρ 1/2 ≤ m r ≤ m n . In this case, the distance between p(θ n (m n )) and p(θ r (m r )) is such that
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (4.8) and in (4.3). Note that this bound is larger than the one in the previous case.
Finally, consider the remaining case where p(θ r (m r )) > p(θ n (m n )) and m r < m n −2ρ 1/2 < m n .
First, note that m r ≥ V , because m r ∈ (V,x r ) if V <x r , and m r = V if V ≥x r . This observation implies that m n > V + ρ 1/2 , because if m n ≤ V + ρ 1/2 then m r < V − ρ 1/2 < V , which is a contradiction. Second, note that if V <x n , then m n ∈ (V,x n ) and, if V ≥x n , then m n = V .
Since m n > V , this observation implies that m n <x n .
, because m n is the optimal search decision when J = J n . Therefore, we have
To obtain the second inequality we have used the facts that p(θ n (x)) is concave in x for all
, that m r +ρ 1/2 < m n <x n , and that m n −ρ 1/2 −V > 0. To obtain the third inequality we have used the facts that m r + ρ 1/2 < m n − ρ 1/2 , and that p(θ n (m r )) > p(θ n (m r + ρ 1/2 )). Next,
Subtracting this inequality from the previous result and dividing by ρ 1/2 , we obtain
where the last line uses the fact that the distance between p(θ r (m)) and p(θ n (m)) is smaller than p 0 (0)α θ ρ, and that m r + ρ 1/2 − V is smaller thanx − x.
Overall, we have established that the distance between p(θ r (m r )) and p(θ n (m n )) is such that
Since this result holds for all (V, y) ∈ X × Y , we conclude that ||p r −p n || < α p (ρ). ¥
Unemployment Value
Given the firm's value function J ∈ J , the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.7) is the market tightness, θ, defined in (4.1). Given θ, the solution to the equilibrium condition (2.1) is the search value function, R, defined as R(V, y) = max x∈X f (x, V, y). Given R, the value functionof unemployment is a solution to the equilibrium condition (2.2) if and only if it is a fixed point of the mapping T U defined as
In the next lemma, we prove that the mapping T U has a unique fixed point in the set C(Y ) of bounded continuous functions ϕ : Y → R. Therefore, there exists a unique value function of unemployment, U ∈ C(Y ), that satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.2), and that depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, but not through the distribution of workers across different employment states, (u, g).
Lemma 4.6. (i) There exists a unique function
Proof: In Appendix C. ¥ Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let θ n denote the market tightness function computed with J n , R n the search value function computed with θ n , and U n the unemployment value function computed with R n . Similarly, let θ r , R r and U r be the functions generated from J r . In the following lemma, we prove that, if the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, so does the distance between U n and U r .
Lemma 4.7. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let us suppress the dependence of various functions onŷ. Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number. Let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ.
Let y be an arbitrary point in Y . The distance between U n (y) and U r (y) is such that
To obtain the second inequality we have used the fact that the distance between U n + λ u R n (U n ) and U n + λ u R n (U n ) is smaller than the distance between U n and U r . Since the above result holds for all y ∈ Y , it follows that kU n − U r k < α u ρ. ¥
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BRE with Dynamic Contracts
In the previous section, we took an arbitrary firm's value function, J ∈ J . Given J, we computed the market tightness, θ, the search value and policy functions, R and m, and the unemployment value function, U , that solve the equilibrium conditions (2.7), (2.1) and (2.2). In this section, we insert J, θ, R, m and U into the RHS of the equilibrium condition (2.3) to compute an update,J, of the firm's value function J. This process implicitly defines an operator T throughJ = T J. In subsection 5.1, we prove thatJ depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across employment states, (u, g). Then, we prove thatJ satisfies the properties (J1), (J2) and (J3) of the set J . These findings imply that the operator T maps the set J into itself. In subsection 5.1, we use the properties of θ, R, m, and U in order to prove that the operator T is continuous in J. Finally, in subsection 5.2, we use Schauder's fixed point theorem to prove that the operator T has a fixed point and, hence, that a BRE exists.
Updated Value Function of the Firm
Consider an arbitrary firm's value function J ∈ J . Let θ denote the market tightness function that satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.7) given J. Let R and m denote the search value and policy functions that satisfy the equilibrium condition (2.1) given θ. Let U denote the unemployment value function that satisfies the equilibrium condition (2.2) given R. Inserting J, θ, R, m and U into the RHS of the equilibrium condition (2.3), we obtain an update,J, of the firm's value function J. More specifically,J is given by 19 
J(V, y, z)
= max
The updated value function of the firm,J, has four important properties. First,J depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of workers across different employment states, (u, g). This property follows immediately from the fact that both the objective function and the choice set on the RHS of (5.1) depend on y but not on (u, g). Second, the updated value function,J, is bi-Lipschitz continuous in V . More specifically, for all (y, z) ∈ Y × Z and all V 1 , V 2 ∈ X, with The bounds B J ,B J , J, andJ are set as
With these bounds,J satisfies conditions (J1)-(J3) and, hence, belongs to the set J , as stated in the next lemma. 
Denote F 0 (γ, V, y, z) as the derivative of F (γ, V, y, z) with respect to V . It is easy to verify that
(i) First, we want to prove thatJ satisfies property (J1) of the set J . To this aim, let (y, z)
be an arbitrary point in Y × Z, and let V 1 , V 2 be two points in X with V 1 ≤ V 2 . The distance
The inequality above implies that the functionJ is Lipschitz continuous in V . Therefore, it is absolutely continuous and almost everywhere differentiable with respect to V (see [25] , p112).
The function F is differentiable with respect to V . Therefore, at any point of differentiability, the derivative ofJ with respect to V is equal to F 0 (γ * (V, y, z), V, y, z), where γ * (V, y, z) belongs to arg max γ∈Γ F (γ, V, y, z) (see [16] , Theorem 1). From these properties ofJ, it follows that the differenceJ(V 2 , y, z) −J(V 1 , y, z) is such that
(ii) Next, we want to prove thatJ satisfies property (J2) of the set J . To this aim, let (V, y, z)
be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. Also, let γ 0 denote the tuple (π 1,0 ,Ṽ 1,0 ,V 1,0 ,V 2,0 ), where
where the first inequality uses the bounds on y, z, w and J, and the second inequality uses convexity of υ −1 (.). Also, the firm's valueJ(V, y, z) is such that
where the first inequality uses the fact that γ 0 belongs to Γ, and the second inequality uses the bounds on y, z, w and J.
(iii) In Appendix F, we prove thatJ is concave with respect to V . Hence,J satisfies property (J3) of the set J . ¥ Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let θ n , R n ,p n , U n , F n andJ n denote the functions computed with J n . Let θ r , R r ,p r , U r , F r andJ r denote the functions computed with J r . The next lemma proves that the mapping T is continuous; that is, as the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, the distance betweenJ n andJ r converges to zero as well. The functionJ depends on J through (θ, R, U,p) and (w, d,V ). We have already established that θ, R, U andp are all continuous in J. A main step in proving continuity ofJ in J is to prove that the job-destruction probability d is continuous in J. The proof of the following lemma uses a constructive approach to establish this result.
Lemma 5.2. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
where
Proof: For the sake of brevity, suppress the dependence of various functions on (ŷ,ẑ). Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number. Let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ. Let (V, y, z) be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. Without loss in generality, assume that J n (V, y, z) ≤J r (V, y, z). (IfJ n (V, y, z) >J r (V, y, z), just switch the roles ofJ n andJ r in the proof below.)
For J = J r in the firm's problem in (5.3), denote as γ r = (π 1,r ,Ṽ 1,r ,V 1,r ,V 2,r ) a tuple such that γ r ∈ Γ is a solution to the firm's problem; i.e.,J r (V, y, z) = F r (γ r , V, y, z). Let w i,r and d i,r be the wage and the separation probability implied by (5.3) with γ = γ r and J = J r . For
where π 1,n = π 1,r ,Ṽ 1,n =Ṽ 1,r , and
Let w i,n and d i,n be the wage and separation probability implied by (5.3) with γ = γ n and J = J n .
Eq. (5.5) implies d i,n = d i,r . The choice γ n , together with (w i,n , d i,n ), is feasible for the firm when J = J n , but may not necessarily be optimal. Thus, F n (γ n , V, y, z) ≤J n (V, y, z), and
We prove that the last difference is bounded by the RHS of (5.4).
First, we want to bound the distance ||V i,n −V i,r ||. To this aim, let (ŷ,ẑ) denote an arbitrary point in Y × Z. Consider the case in whichV i,r + λ e R n (V i,r ) − U n has the same sign asV i,r + λ e R r (V i,r ) − U r . In this case,V i,n =V i,r and, hence, ||V i,n −V i,r || < αV ρ. Next, consider the case in whichV i,r + λ e R n (V i,r ) − U n has a different sign fromV i,r + λ e R r (V i,r ) − U r . In this case, the absolute value ofV i,r + λ e R n (V i,r ) − U n is such thatV 6) where the second inequality uses the bounds in (4.9) and (4.12). Moreover, the absolute value of
where the equality uses the definition ofV i,n in (5.5), and the inequality uses the bounds in (4.6).
From (5.6) and (5.7), it follows that (0 <)V i,n −V i,r < αV ρ and, hence, |V i,n −V i,r | < αV ρ. Since these results hold for all (ŷ,ẑ) ∈ Y × Z, we have
Second, we want to bound the distance |w i,r − w i,n |. From the definitions of w i,r and w i,n , it follows that υ(w i,r ) and υ(w i,n ) are
where the last line uses the fact that, by construction,Ṽ i,n =Ṽ i,r and d i,n = d i,r . From the previous equations, it follows that the distance between υ(w i,n ) and υ(w i,r ) is such that
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (4.12), (5.8) and (4.9). Taken together, the two inequalities in (5.9) imply that
Third, we want to bound the distance between (1−λ epn (V i,n ))J n (V i,n ) and (1−λ epr (V i,r ))J r (V i,r )
To this aim, note that the distance between J n (V i,n ) and J r (V i,r ) is such that
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (5.8). Also, note that the distance betweenp n ( 
(5.13)
Finally, we prove that the difference, F r (γ r , V, y, z) − F n (γ n , V, y, z), is bounded by the RHS of (5.4). From the bounds (5.8), (5.10) and (5.13), it follows that
Since the above inequality holds for all (V, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z, it implies the result stated in the lemma. ¥
Existence of a BRE with Dynamic Contracts
Now, we are in the position to establish the paper's main result.
Theorem 5.3. There exists a BRE with dynamic contracts.
Proof: First, fix ε > 0 to be an arbitrary real number. Let ρ ε be the unique positive solution for ρ of the equation βλ e α p (ρ)J + α j ρ = ε. For all J n , J r ∈ J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ ε , Lemma 5.2 implies that kT J n − T J r k < ε. Hence, the equilibrium operator T is continuous.
Next, let ρ y denote the minimum distance between distinct elements of the set Y , and let ρ z be the minimum distance between distinct elements of the set Z, i.e. ρ y = min Y |y i − y j | and , (u, g) . Hence, the functions {θ * , R * , m * , U * , J * , c * } constitute a BRE. ¥ Directed search is necessary for existence of a BRE. To see this necessity clearly, suppose that search is random, instead. Then the equilibrium condition (2.7) is replaced by 14) and θ(ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. The term on the LHS of (5.14) is the cost of creating a vacancy. The expression on the RHS of (5.14) is the maximized benefit of creating a vacancy. The first term on the RHS is the probability that a firm meets a worker. The second term denotes the probability that a worker met by a firm is willing to accept an employment contract that provides him with the lifetime utility x. The third term is the value to the firm of being matched with a worker to whom it has promised the lifetime utility x. With random search, the worker who meets the firm is a random draw from the distribution of workers over the values, and so a worker's acceptance probability of a new match depends on the distribution of workers across employment states. That is, the dependence of I(x, ψ) on g is not trivial. In this case, the equilibrium condition (5.14) holds only if the distribution affects also the equilibrium market tightness or the firm's value function. In either case, the equilibrium fails to be block recursive with random search. In contrast, directed search eliminates the dependence of the acceptance probability on the distribution of workers because a worker always accepts a job that he chooses to search for; that is, I (x * , ψ) = 1 where x * = m (V, ψ). 21 For the sake of completeness, let us list three other assumptions about the production technology and the search process that are necessary for existence of a BRE: the linear production function, the vacancy cost independent of the aggregate vacancy rate, and a matching technology with constant returns to scale. If the production function were either concave or convex, the distribution of workers across different employment states would affect the output of a match and, in turn, the firm's value function, the market tightness function and the value of unemployment. If the vacancy cost depends the aggregate vacancy rate, the distribution of workers across different employment states would affect the aggregate vacancy rate, the vacancy cost and, ultimately, the equilibrium market tightness. Finally, if the matching process between vacancies and applicants exhibits non-constant returns to scale, the distribution of applicants across different submarkets (and, hence, the distribution of workers across different employment states) would affect the market tightness function and, in turn, the firm's and worker's value functions. We emphasize that these assumptions are standard. For example, they are maintained in the models of search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen [5] , Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] , and Burdett and Coles [4] , where the equilibrium fails to be block recursive because search is undirected. 22 
BRE with Fixed-Wage Contracts
In the model with fixed-wage contracts, the equilibrium operator T may not be continuous. For example, the search value function, R n , and the unemployment value function, U n , computed with the firm's value function J n may be such that the worker prefers being employed at the wage w than being unemployed. However, given a different value function J r that is arbitrarily close to J n , the search value function, R r , and the unemployment value function, U r , may be such that the worker prefers unemployment to employment. In this case, the probability that a worker leaves a job that pays the wage w is not continuous in J and, hence, the firm's value from employing a worker at the wage w, K(w, s) defined in (2.5), and the firm's updated value function, T J, are not continuous in J. 23 Since the equilibrium operator T may not be continuous, we cannot directly appeal to Schauder's theorem in order to prove existence of a fixed point of T and, in turn, existence of a BRE. Instead, we adopt the following strategy. We consider a proxy of the model with fixedwage contracts in which a worker is not allowed to voluntarily quit his jobs during the separation stage. Formally, in this proxy model, the equilibrium conditions (2.4) and (2.5) are replaced by
and
We prove that the equilibrium operator associated with the proxy model admits a fixed point because it satisfies all the conditions of Schauder's theorem (including continuity). We use the fixed point to construct a BRE of the proxy model. If, along the equilibrium path, a worker never has the incentive to quit his job during the separation stage, the BRE of the proxy model is also a BRE of the original model.
Employment Value
Given an arbitrary value function of a firm, J ∈ J , let R denote the search value function that solves the equilibrium condition (2.1), and U the unemployment value function that solves the equilibrium condition (2.2). Given R and U , an employment value function is a solution to the equilibrium condition (6.1) if and only if it is a fixed point of the mapping T H defined as
In Lemma 6.1, we prove that there exists a unique fixed point of the mapping T H within the set C(W ×Y ) of bounded continuous functions ϕ : W ×Y → R (where W is defined below). Therefore, there exists a unique employment value function, H, that satisfies the equilibrium condition (6.1), and depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y. Moreover, in Lemma 6.1, we prove that H is strictly decreasing and bi-Lipschitz continuous in w.
(ii) For all y ∈ Y and all w 1 , w 2 ∈ W , w 1 ≤ w 2 , H is such that
From the properties of the employment value function, H, we can derive some properties of the wage function, h, which is the solution of the equation H(w, ψ) = V with respect to w. First, since H is strictly increasing in w, h is well-defined. Second, since H is strictly increasing and 28 bi-Lipschitz continuous in w, h is strictly increasing and bi-Lipschitz in V . More specifically, for all y ∈ Y and all V 1 , V 2 ∈ X, with V 1 ≤ V 2 , we have
Finally, since H is strictly increasing in w and satisfies property (6.5), h(V, y) belongs to the interval W for all (V, y) ∈ X × Y . Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let R n , U n , H n and h n denote the functions computed with J n . Similarly, let R r , U r , H r and h r denote the functions computed with J r ∈ J .
Lemma 6.2 proves that as the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, the distance between H n and H r and the distance between h n and h r both converge to zero. That is, H and h are continuous in J.
Lemma 6.2. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
Proof: Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number; let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ. Let (w, y) be an arbitrary point in W × Y . Then, the distance between H n (w, y) and H r (w, y) is such that
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (4.12), (4.9), and (4.6). Since the above result holds for all (w, y) ∈ W × Y , the RHS is an upper bound on kH n − H r k. Re-arranging terms yields the bound on kH n − H r k given by (6.7). Now, let (V, y) be an arbitrary point in X × Y . The distance between h n (V, y) and h r (V, y)
is such that
where the first inequality uses the fact that H n (w, y) satisfies condition (6.4) , and the equality uses the fact that H n (h n (V, y), y) = H r (h r (V, y), y) = V . Since the above result holds for all (V, y) ∈ X × Y , the RHS is an upper bound on kh n − h r k, as given by (6.7). ¥
Value Function of the Firm
Let H andp denote the employment value function and the separation probability computed with an arbitrary function J ∈ J . Given H andp, a firm's value function is a solution to the equilibrium condition (6.2) if and only if it is a fixed point of the mapping T K defined as
In Lemma 6.3, we prove that there exists a unique fixed point of the mapping T K within the set
Therefore, there exists a unique value function of the firm, K, that satisfies the equilibrium condition (6.2), and that depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component of productivity, y. Then, we prove that K is bounded between K andK, where
Finally, we prove that K is bi-Lipschitz continuous in w. That is, for all w 1 ≤ w 2 , the difference
In the remainder of this section, we will assume that the parameters of the model are such that
For all (y, z) ∈ Y × Z and all w 1 , w 2 ∈ W , with w 1 ≤ w 2 , K is such that
Proof: In Appendix E. ¥ Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let R n , U n , H n , h n and K n denote the functions computed with J n . Similarly, let R r , U r , H r , h r and K r denote the functions computed with J r ∈ J . Lemma 6.4 proves that as the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, the distance between K n and K r goes to zero as well.
Proof: Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number; let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ. Let (w, y, z) be an arbitrary point in W × Y × Z. The distance between K n (w, y, z) and K r (w, y, z) is such that
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (6.7), (6.9) and (4.4). Since this result holds for all (w, y, z) ∈ W × Y × Z, the RHS is an upper bound on kK n − K r k. Re-arranging terms yields the bound on kK n − K r k given by (6.11) . ¥
Existence of a BRE with Fixed-Wage Contracts
In the previous subsections, we have computed the employment value function, H, the wage function, h, and the firm's value function, K, associated with an arbitrary J ∈ J . In this subsection, we insert K and h into the right-hand side of the equilibrium condition (2.6), and we compute an update,J = T J, for the value function J. More specifically,J is given bỹ hence, it belongs to the set J . This argument is formalized in the following lemma:
Then, the updated value function,J, belongs to the set J .
Proof: (i) Let (V, y, z) be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. Then,J(V, y, z) is such that
where we used the fact that ifṼ 1 ∈ X then h(Ṽ 1 , y) ∈ W . The above inequalities imply thatJ satisfies property (J1) of the set J .
(ii) Let (y, z) be an arbitrary point in Y × Z, and V 1 , V 2 two arbitrary points in X, with
denote the maximizer of (6.12) for V = V 1 , and {π i,2 ,Ṽ i,2 } 2 i=1 the maximizer of (6.12) 
belongs to the choice set of (6.12) for V = V 2 . Therefore,
The above inequalities imply thatJ satisfies property (J2) of the set J .
(iii) Finally, Appendix F shows thatJ is concave with respect to V . Hence,J satisfies property (J3) of the set J . ¥ Now, consider two arbitrary functions J n , J r ∈ J . Let H n , h n , K n andJ n denote the functions computed with J n . Similarly, let H r , h r , K r andJ r denote the functions computed with J r ∈ J .
Lemma 6.4 proves that as the distance between J n and J r converges to zero, the distance betweeñ J n andJ r goes to zero as well. 32
Lemma 6.6. For any ρ > 0 and any J n , J r ∈ J , if kJ n − J r k < ρ, then
Proof: Let ρ > 0 be an arbitrary real number; let J n and J r be arbitrary functions in J such that kJ n − J r k < ρ. Denote as H n , h n and K n the functions computed with J n , and H r h r and K r the functions computed with J r . Let (V, y, z) be an arbitrary point in X × Y × Z. The distance betweenJ n (V, y, z) andJ r (V, y, z) is such thatJ
where the last inequality uses the bounds in (6.7), (6.9) and (6.11). Since this result holds for all (V, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z, the RHS is an upper bound on ||J n −J r ||. ¥ Lemma 6.5 implies that the equilibrium operator T maps the set J into itself. Moreover, since the functions in the set J are bi-Lipschitz and the sets Y and Z are finite, Lemma 6.5
implies that the family of functions T (J ) is equicontinuous. In addition, Lemma 6.6 implies that the operator T is continuous. Since these properties of the operator T are sufficient to apply Schauder's fixed point theorem, there exists a function J * ∈ J such that T J * = J * . The firm's value function J * , the associated tightness function θ * , search value function R * , search policy function m * , and unemployment value function U * , constitute a BRE. This completes the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 6.7. There exists a BRE for the proxy of the model with fixed-wage contracts.
For any BRE of the proxy model, we can compute the worker's value of unemployment, U * (y), and the worker's value of employment at the beginning of the search stage, H * (w, y) + λ e max{0, R * (H * (w, y), y)}. A BRE of the proxy model is a BRE of the original model if
for all equilibrium wages w and for all realizations of the aggregate component of productivity y. This condition implicitly restricts the parameter values of the model. We do not explicitly characterize this restriction here. However, notice that, since unemployed workers search for jobs that offer lifetime utility H * (w, y) greater than U * (y) and since employed workers search for even better jobs, (6.14) is likely to be satisfied as long as the dispersion in the realizations of aggregate productivity shocks is sufficiently small. This is the case in the calibrated example below. 33
A Calibrated Example
In sections 5 and 6, we have established existence of a BRE in a stochastic model of directed search on the job. In this section, we illustrate additional properties of a BRE by calibrating the model to the data on the US labor market. Given the calibrated parameters, we construct the equilibrium operator T and we apply it to an arbitrary value function, J ∈ J , until we reach a fixed point, J * . Then, we construct a BRE by computing the agents' value functions, policy functions and the market tightness function associated with J * . For the sake of brevity, we report our findings only for the version of the model with fixed-wage contracts.
The parameters in workers' preferences are the discount factor, β, and the value of leisure, b.
The parameters in the search technology are the probability that an unemployed worker is able to search, λ u , the probability that an employed worker is able to search, λ e , and the parameters in the job-finding probability function, p(θ). We assume that p(θ) = θ(1 + θ γ ) −1/γ . The parameters in the production technology are the vacancy cost, k, the exogenous job-destruction probability, δ, and the parameters in the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic and the aggregate components of productivity. We assume that the idiosyncratic component of productivity, z, is always equal to zero, and that the aggregate component of productivity, y, obeys a two-state Markov process, with y ∈ {0.95, 1.05}. The unconditional mean of y is normalized to 1.
We set the model period to be one quarter. We set β equal to 0.987, so that the annual interest rate in the model is 5 percent. We set k, δ, and λ e equal to 10 −7 , 0.045, and 0.3 respectively, so that the average transition rates between employment, unemployment, and across employers are the same in the model as in the US data. 25 We normalize λ u to 1. We tentatively set γ to 0.2, which implies an elasticity of substitution between vacancies and applicants of 5/6. Finally, we set b equal to 0.7, so that the consumption value of leisure is 70 percent of the consumption value of work (a figure that is empirically supported by [10] ).
Given these parameter values, we compute a BRE of the proxy model. In Figure 1 , we plot the equilibrium market tightness, θ * , as a function of the value promised by the firms to the workers, x, and conditional on the current realization of the aggregate component of productivity, y. Conditional on either realization of y, the market tightness is strictly decreasing with respect to x whenever θ * (x, y) is positive, and it is equal to zero otherwise, which confirms the generic properties proven in Lemma 4.1. Conditional on any promised value x, the market tightness is higher when the realization of the aggregate component of productivity is higher. This property is intuitive. When y is higher, firms create more vacancies per applicant because the value of 25 The data used for the calibration are described in Section 5 of Menzio and Shi [14] .
filling a vacancy is higher. 26 In Figure 2 , we plot the equilibrium search strategy of a worker, m * , as a function of the value of his current employment position, V , and conditional on the current realization of the aggregate component of productivity, y. Conditional on either realization of y, a worker chooses to look for a job that offers him the lifetime utility m * (V, y) > V whenever V <x(y), and that offers him the lifetime utility m * (V, y) = V otherwise. We proved in section 4.2 that this property of the search strategy is generic. Conditional on any value V , a worker chooses to look for a job that offers him a higher lifetime utility when the realization of the aggregate component of productivity is higher. In Figure 3 , we plot the job finding probability of a worker,p * , as a function of the value of his current employment position, V , and conditional on the realization of the aggregate component of productivity, y. The probabilityp * is decreasing in V and increasing in y.
In Figure 4 , we plot the equilibrium lifetime utility of an employed worker, H * , as a function of his wage, w, and conditional on the current realization of the aggregate component of productivity,
y. Similarly, in Figure 5 , we plot the equilibrium profits of a firm that employs a worker, K * , as a function of the wage, w, and conditional on the aggregate productivity, y. 27 Conditional on either realization of y, the lifetime utility of an employed worker is strictly increasing in w, while the profits of a firm that employs a worker are strictly decreasing in w. Conditional on any wage, both the lifetime utility of the worker and the profits of the firm are higher when the realization of the aggregate component of productivity is higher. Intuitively, when y is higher, the lifetime utility of the worker is higher because the value of searching, R * , and the value of unemployment, U * , are higher. The profits of the firm are higher because the amount of output produced by the worker is higher. Given these properties of K * and H * , it follows that the profits of a firm from filling a vacancy, J * , are a decreasing function of the value promised to the worker, and an increasing function of the current realization of the aggregate component of productivity (see Figure 6 ). Moreover, the lottery is not used in equilibrium in this example. Finally, (6.14) is satisfied everywhere along the equilibrium path and, hence, the BRE of the proxy model is also a BRE of the original model.
By looking at Figures 1 through 6 , the reader can see that our model preserves many of the attractive features of the steady-state equilibrium of the models by Burdett and Mortensen [5] , 26 The reader should notice that not all submarkets need to be active in equilibrium. For example, in the nonstochastic steady state, there are only countably many active submarkets. The submarket V 1 = m * (U ) is visited by the unemployed workers. The submarket V n+1 = m * (V n ) is visited by the workers who are employed at the wage wn = h(Vn) for n = 1, 2, ... In the stochastic equilibrium, the number of markets that are active depends on the history of realizations of the aggregate component of productivity. 27 For the sake of completeness, the reader should notice that the worker's value of unemployment, U * , is 80.79 for y = 0.95, and 80.87 for y = 1.05.
Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] and Burdett and Coles [4] . For example, since workers who have different luck with their job applications are generally employed at different wages (Figures 2 and   4 ), our model generates residual wage inequality. Since workers employed at higher wages look for jobs that offer more generous terms of trade and are harder to find (Figures 2 and 3) , our model generates a positive correlation between tenure and wages. For the same reason, our model generates a negative correlation between tenure and job hazard.
By looking at Figures 1 through 6 , the reader can also see that the distribution of workers across different employment states affects the aggregate behavior of the economy even though it does not affect the agents' value and policy functions. For example, since workers employed at different jobs have different probabilities of finding a better job (Figure 3) , the distribution of workers affects the average employer-to-employer transition rate. Since workers in different employment states search in submarkets with different tightness (Figures 1 and 3) , the distribution of workers affects the vacancy rate. Finally, since workers in different jobs have different wages (Figure 4 ), the distribution of workers affects the average wage. These observations also imply that the aggregate economy responds to a shock to the aggregate component of productivity through two different channels. First, the aggregate behavior of the economy is directly affected by the change in individual behavior brought about by the shock to the aggregate component of productivity. Second, the aggregate behavior of the economy is affected by the change in the distribution of workers that is brought about by the change in individuals' behavior.
Conclusion
In this paper, we prove existence of a BRE for a general model of directed search on the job, which allows for aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks, risk aversion, and different specifications of the contractual environment. The BRE of our model preserves a number of attractive qualitative properties of the models of random search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen [5] , Postel-Vinay and Robin [23] , and Burdett and Coles [4] . That is, the BRE features flows of workers between employment, unemployment, and across different employers; it features residual wage inequality, and a positive return to tenure and experience. However, the BRE of our model differs from these models in that it takes into account directed search and that it is tractable for studying dynamics. In the equilibrium of the random search models, the distribution of workers across different employment states is an infinite-dimensional object which non-trivially affects the agents' value and policy functions. In the BRE of our model, the distribution of workers across different employment states does not affect the agents' value and policy functions. For this reason, while solving the equilibrium of the random search model in a stochastic environment is a difficult task both computationally and analytically, solving the BRE of our model is as easy as solving a representative agent model. These properties of the BRE make our model both a useful and a practical tool for studying labor market dynamics.
It is useful to discuss the robustness of the BRE to the introduction of ex ante heterogeneity on the worker side, since such heterogeneity is a common feature of data. As we have explained, the critical implication of directed search that supports a BRE is that workers choose to sort themselves into different submarkets. In our model, although all workers are ex ante homogeneous, their search histories induce ex post heterogeneity in the value of their employment contracts according to which the workers sort. This implication of sorting continues to hold even when workers are ex ante heterogeneous and, hence, a BRE continues to exist. To see this robustness clearly, suppose that workers are ex-ante heterogeneous and the worker's type is given by s ∈ S ⊂ R n . For example, s may consist of the gender, age and education of the worker. A submarket is now indexed by x : S → X n , where x(s) denotes the value of the employment contract offered to an applicant of type s. A submarket is now characterized by a vacancy-to-applicant ratio θ(x), and by the distribution of applicants across types, ϕ(s, x). It is straightforward to verify that in equilibrium firms choose to specialize and use each offer to cater only to one particular type of workers. Because of such sorting, the distribution of applicants across types and acceptance probabilities is degenerate in every active submarket and a BRE can be shown to exist. Similar sorting with directed search has been established by [26] in an assignment model with two-sided heterogeneity and by [15] in a monetary model where buyers are heterogeneous in money holdings.
Our method for characterizing the BRE will also be useful for studying dynamics in related markets. For example, Shi [26] has used a directed search model to characterize the equilibrium and efficient patterns of the assignment between ex-ante heterogeneous jobs and workers.
However, he does not allow agents to continue to search after they are matched. By allowing for on-the-job search in that model, one can use the method in the current paper to study the dynamics of the assignment. Another example is the model by Gonzalez and Shi [8] , who characterize a labor market equilibrium in which each unemployed worker learns about his type during search.
As workers' matching histories diverge during the search process, there is a non-degenerate distribution of workers' beliefs, and this distribution is an aggregate state variable of the economy.
The analysis of the equilibrium in Gonzalez and Shi [8] is tractable precisely because search is directed and the equilibrium is block recursive. However, they focus on the steady state. Using the method in the current paper, one can study aggregate dynamics of the learning equilibrium.
(iii) Finally, we prove that the set J is convex. To this aim, consider arbitrary J 1 , J 2 ∈ J and an arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1]. Denote J α (V, y, z) = αJ 1 (V, y, z)+(1−α)J 2 (V, y, z). For all (y, z) ∈ Y ×Z and all V 1 , V 2 ∈ X, with V 1 ≤ V 2 , the difference J α (V 2 , y, z) − J α (V 1 , y, z) is such that 
(B.
2)
The difference k/J(x 2 ) − k/J(x 1 ) is equal to
